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The EU’s Engagement with China in Building a 
Multilateral Climate Change Regime: Uneasy Process 
Towards an Effective Approach
Introduction
Global climate change poses one of the most serious threats to the international community.  
In order to cope with this threat, an international climate change regime was established in 
the 1990s. It is still under construction after several rounds of international negotiations. 
This  multilateral  endeavour  could  arguably  be  conceived  as  a  form  of  crystallizing 
multilateralism,  with  new  international  rules  and  organisations  in  the  process  of  being 
established (Bouchard and Peterson 2011: 20-21). It is a well-established fact that “from 1990 
until 2008 the EU has positioned itself, and was conceived, as the lead actor in global climate 
governance” (Keukeleire  and  Bruyninckx  2011:  360).  In  particular,  the  EU  succeeded  in 
establishing the Kyoto regime, even without the support of the sole remaining superpower, 
the United States. However, in the process of building a post-Kyoto regime, the EU has found 
itself less influential than in the past. The return of the United States and the more assertive 
role played by emerging countries all complicated the situation at the Copenhagen summit in 
2009. 
The European Union and China are two key players in climate change politics, in terms of 
their  huge contributions to, and their  significant  influence in,  solving the problem. While the 
EU has been a crucial actor in the climate change regime-building for over a decade, China’s 
rising role only fully emerged at the 2009 Copenhagen climate change conference, where, 
supported by other BASIC countries, India, Brazil and South Africa, China cut a modest deal 
with the United States. This agreement, coined the “Copenhagen Accord”, became the only 
result from the high-profile and long-awaited conference. The Accord, seen by the European 
countries as a minimalist one, was finalized without European participation, but European 
countries had to endorse it, albeit reluctantly.
The Copenhagen experience indicates that the EU’s claim of being a “leader” in the climate 
change issue has been confronted with the visions that third actors hold on this subject, and 
which clash with the predominant European vision. Among these third actors, China is surely 
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one of the most challenging, given its weight in world affairs as well as its strong stance 
during the climate change negotiations, which call into question the EU’s capacity to play a 
leading role on this issue and of its being followed by other actors.
Therefore,  this  paper  will  analyse the  EU’s  efforts  to  engage  with  new  rising  players, 
particularly China, as it sought to build a post-Kyoto multilateral climate regime. Firstly, it will  
trace  the  development  of  the  EU’s  engagement  with  China  before  the  Copenhagen 
conference.  Secondly,  it  will  analyse  the  EU-China  interactions  during  and  after  the 
Copenhagen climate change conference, highlighting how they failed to build on their bilateral 
collaborations to produce a global pact that the EU had desired. Lastly, the paper will look at 
the adjustment of the EU’s climate change negotiation approach, and its more pragmatic 
bilateral engagement with China, which contributed to the more substantial results coming out 
of the Cancun conference in 2010. In the conclusion, we will raise a few suggestions for the 
EU  if  it  seeks  to  play  a  more  effective  role  in  moving  the  multilateral  climate  change 
negotiation forward in the future.
The EU’s Pre-Copenhagen Engagement with China in Global 
Climate Governance 
With the multilateral process of global governance of climate change involving 194 countries, 
the  EU  attaches  growing  importance  to  China’s  role  in  international  negotiations.  Their 
relations on climate change have evolved accordingly.
China as an Insignificant Partner (1989-2000) 
In the period from February 1991 to May 1992, during which the international community 
negotiated  and  adopted the  United  Nations  Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change 
Convention (UNFCCC), international negotiations of climate change proceeded on a broadly 
triangular  basis  among  the  (then)  European  Community,  the  United  States  and  the 
developing countries (Dasgupta 1994: 139; Djoghlaf 1994: 97).
The divergences during international negotiations of climate change arose between two main 
camps  above  all.  While  developed  countries  tended  either  to  ignore,  or  at  least  to  de-
emphasize,  the  link  between  the  historical  responsibility  of  developed  countries  in  their 
contribution  to  climate  change  and  the  collective  responsibility  of  all  countries  to  take 
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corrective action, developing countries argued that developed countries should take the lead 
in addressing climate change due to their major historical responsibility of contributing to the 
climate change by emitting much more greenhouse gases  (GHG) (Dasgupta 1994: 134). 
While the developed countries pressed the developing countries to accept commitments on 
carbon reduction, developing countries emphasized that eliminating poverty and improving 
people’s  lives  were  their  priorities. China  fully  participated in  the  work  of  Group  771 in 
negotiations while simultaneously maintaining its independent status. Group 77/China as a 
negotiating force took common positions on some proposals and arrived at a consensus on 
other issues. China was not an important player for EC during this period.
Furthermore,  due  to  the  clear  opposition  of  the  US  on binding  targets  and  timetable  of 
stabilization of emissions and her biggest share of emissions worldwide, most of the EC’s 
foreign efforts were put on formulating consensus with other developed countries such as 
Japan and Australia in an effort to try to change the US’s positions. At the same time, China 
tended neither to oppose, nor over-emphasize, the binding target for developed countries to 
limit greenhouse gases proposed by the EC to be included in the convention, while firmly 
rejecting that it and other developing countries should accept any specific target of limiting 
GHG (China’s  Coordination  Group of  Climate  Change  1995:  259).  After  finalization  of  a 
common US-EC formulation on their commitments regarding emissions, the Convention was 
close to being reached (Dasgupta 1994: 143).
The  adoption of  the  UNFCCC implies  that  main  negotiators  including the  EU， US and 
developing  countries  achieved  consensus  on  climate  change  at  a  multilateral  level  with 
divergences put aside. As parties to UNFCCC, they are all committed to the stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level which would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic climate interference with the climate system, in accordance with their common 
but  differentiated  responsibilities  and  respective  capabilities.  For  the  EC,  the Framework 
Convention “made a large contribution towards the establishment of key principles of  the 
international  fight  against  climate change” but  the Convention fell  short  in  that  it  did “not 
contain commitments in figures, detailed on a country by country basis, in terms of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions”.2 
1 The  Group  of  77 (G-77) is a loose  intergovernmental organization grouping the developing countries in the 
United  Nations.  It  was  established  on  15  June  1964  in the  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and 
Development in Geneva. Its aim is to help developing countries “to articulate and promote their collective 
economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all  major international economic issues 
within the United Nations system, and promote South-South cooperation for development”. See “About the 
Group of G77”, http://www.g77.org/doc/ 
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The period 1995 to 1997 saw international efforts to advance the climate regime towards a 
binding  protocol  to  strengthen  the  commitments  made  in  the  UNFCCC.  China  enjoyed 
enhanced national power while also seeing its emissions increase. The EU as an important 
proponent  of  international  governance of  climate change reiterated its  position in  COP33, 
favouring  consideration  of  new  commitments  for  developing  countries  including  China. 
Although maintaining a low profile, the EU joined the US in exerting pressure upon China to 
accept  items favouring  their  own positions  (Liu  1998).  China  resisted  new commitments 
proposed by developed countries including the EU at the conference. The G77/China said “it  
is  not  the time to address developing country commitments, but  to strengthen developed 
country commitments” (IISD 1997: 2). China also raised the issue of the poor performance of 
Annex I Parties4 in meeting existing commitments. The Chinese negotiators made it even 
more explicit claiming that “it is impossible for China to fulfil the duty of reducing greenhouse 
gases before China becomes a medium-developed country” (IISD 1997: 2).
Despite the divergences among major players, The Kyoto Protocol was finally adopted on 12 
December 1997.  The key feature of  this treaty is  that  it  commits  developed countries to 
reduce greenhouse gases within the timeframe of 2008 to 2012, which was one of the EU’s 
biggest objectives in COP3. Although the EU joined the US in exerting subtle pressure on 
China at this conference, the EU still regarded China as just another developing state rather 
than a player in its own right. In contrast to the US, which argued that developing countries 
should accept targets or limitations during the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period, the 
EU took  a  more  conciliatory  approach.  Thus,  right  after  Kyoto  Conference,  the  Chinese 
leadership believed that the biggest  pressure in the short  term would come from the US 
rather than the EU, albeit with the general sense that the developed countries would exert 
further  pressure  on  China  later (Liu  1998).  Specifically  speaking,  China  realized  that 
developed countries would urge China to take on more commitments of reducing emissions 
which were beyond her capacities in international negotiations of climate change later.
2 'Kyoto Protocol on climate change', 14 June 2010, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/environment/tackling_climate_change/l28060_en.htm 
3 Since the UNFCCC entered into force, the parties have been meeting annually in Conferences of the Parties 
(COP) to assess progress in dealing with climate change, and beginning in the mid-1990s, to negotiate the 
Kyoto Protocol . From 2005 in which the Kyoto Protocol entered into force, the Conferences  of the Parties 
have met in conjunction with Meetings of Parties of the Kyoto Protocol (MOP).
4 Parties to UNFCCC are classified as Annex I countries, Annex II countries and Non Annex I countries. There 
are 41 Annex I countries and the  European Economic Community  is also a member. These countries are 
classified as industrialized countries and countries in transition. They are Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New 
Zealand,  Norway,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Russian  Federation,  Slovakia,  Slovenia,  Spain,  Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America. Annex II countries are a sub-group of 
the Annex I countries which shall provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs 
incurred  by  developing  country  Parties  in  complying  with  their  obligations  under  UNFCCC.  Non Annex  I 
countries are developing country Parties.
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China’s Growing Importance (2001-2007) 
Post-Kyoto, two external factors pushed the EU to regard China as a more important player 
amid China’s rapid growth in both emissions and national power. The first was the collapse, in 
2000, of the Hague Conference (COP6), due to the irreconcilable divergence of the US and 
the EU on the issue of carbon sinks.5 Second, after  President George W. Bush came to 
power, was the withdrawal of the US from the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001, which provoked 
both  strong  international  astonishment  and  criticism.  In  this  context,  the  EU  and  other 
developing countries  including  China  collaborated  closely in  international  climate  change 
negotiations and jointly contributed to the adoption of the “Marrakesh Accords” in COP7  in 
November  2001,  which  includes  the  detailed  rules  for  the  implementation  of  the  Kyoto 
Protocol.  The  EU  established  and  solidified  its  leading  role  in  this  process  by  actively 
engaging other players and setting a good example in climate change policy.6
Relations between the EU and China on climate change have been greatly enhanced since 
2001 and especially after the Kyoto Protocol came into force in 2005 and the post-Kyoto 
process also started. At global level, the EU as a leader and China as an important player 
share common positions  in  the approach and  framework of  a  post-Kyoto  process at  the 
multilateral level. They both ratified the Kyoto Protocol and contributed to its entry into force. 
Moreover, the two sides reaffirmed their commitments to both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol.  They are also committed to moving forward in  the UN forum in the Post-Kyoto 
process and called on all parties to participate actively and constructively in the UNFCCC 
Conference.  Specifically,  both  China  and  Europe  hold  that  developed  countries  should 
commit to a binding scheme in the Post-Kyoto process.7 Therefore, the EU and China as well 
as others met in December 2005 in Montreal and adopted the Montreal Action Plan which is 
an agreement to "extend the life of the Kyoto Protocol beyond its 2012 expiration date and 
negotiate  deeper  cuts  in  greenhouse-gas  emissions”.8 In  September  2007,  the  EU  and 
Chinese delegations to the conference held by the Bush administration supported each other 
5 A carbon  sink  is  anything  that  absorbs  more  carbon  that  it  releases.  See What  are  carbon  sinks?, 
http://www.fern.org/campaign/carbon-trading/what-are-carbon-sinks 
6 For example, the Commission launched the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP) In June 2000 
which identified and developed all the necessary elements of an EU strategy to implement the Kyoto Protocol.  
See EU Commission  (2001),  European Climate Change Programme.  Long Report,  Brussels,  June 2001. 
Available at: http://www.eu-greenlight.org/pdf/eccp_report_0106.pdf 
7 Joint  Statement  of  the  10th  China-EU  Summit,  28  November  2007, http://www.gov.cn/misc/2007-
12/03/content_824127.htm 
8 Summary of The Eleventh Conference of The Parties To The UN Framework Convention On Climate Change 
And First Conference of The Parties serving  as The Meeting of The Parties  to The Kyoto Protocol,12 
December 2005, http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12291e.pdf 
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in arguing that the developed countries should take the lead in making binding commitments, 
on the provision that the developing countries should not be required to do that initially. The 
two sides  also  shared common positions  in  the  Bali  conference  in  December  2007  and 
welcomed the roadmap adopted at the conference.
The EU  also  strengthened bilateral cooperation with China on climate change. Since 2005 
the EU has developed climate change partnerships and dialogues with important emerging 
economies, including Brazil, India, South Korea, South Africa and China, aiming at “involving 
and committing all large emitters” by the realization of “specific projects or programmes to 
improve  energy  efficiency  or  to  promote  low-carbon  technologies  as  well  as  more 
comprehensive policies, including targets” (European Commission COM 2005: 8). Moreover, 
behind these bilateral initiatives there was a precise multilateral purpose, clearly made explicit 
by  the  European  Commission  (Romano  2010:  5).  The  EU-China  Partnership  on  climate 
change  is  one  of  these  initiatives. In  September  2005,  the  EU and  China  agreed  on  a 
Partnership  on  Climate  Change  as  one  of  the  major  outcomes  of  the  annual  China-EU 
Summit of that year. The Partnership is committed to strengthening cooperation and dialogue 
on climate change and energy between the EU and China and, in theory,  provides for a 
robust follow-up process, which includes a regular review of progress in the context of annual 
EU-China Summits.9 The initiative has been praised as “an important step forward towards 
bridging the North-South Divide” (Dai and Diao 2011: 262). Indeed, instead of choosing the 
same confrontational approach the US adopted towards China during the negotiations, the 
EU decided to establish this partnership, with the purpose of understanding China’s point of 
view on climate change and encouraging the country to step up its ambitions in the fight 
against climate change. At the Tenth China-EU Summit, held on 28 November 2007, the two 
sides agreed to step up their efforts to further enhance bilateral cooperation, including their 
cooperation on technology development and transfer.10 Although it  is a variant of bilateral 
cooperation partnership, it underlines both the EU and China’s adherence and commitments 
to working within the UN framework. 
Once the common positions between the EU and China were established,  and with their 
cooperation steadily deepening, the EU paid more attention to the status of  China in the 
discussions of a post-2012 multilateral climate change regime. For example, the European 
Parliament's Temporary Committee on Climate Change dispatched an official delegation to 
9 China-EU Partnership on Climate Change Rolling Work Plan, 19 October 2006, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/tyfls/tfsxw/t283051.htm 
10 Joint  Statement  of  the  10th  China-EU  Summit,  28  November  2007, http://www.gov.cn/misc/2007-
12/03/content_824127.htm 
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China in November, 2007 before the Bali conference. The delegation met with key officials, 
politicians, and experts in order to facilitate cooperation with China in the Bali Conference 
(European Parliament 2007). The EU Commission President, Jose Manuel Barroso, said that 
China was a trustworthy partner for the EU on the issue of climate change and that the EU 
and China should take the common but differentiated responsibilities (Wu, Yang 2007: A7). 
Deepening Collaboration as well as Divergence (2008-2009)
Since  2007,  China  has  become  the  world’s  largest  emitter  of  GHGs (IEA 2009).  This 
development pushed the issue of emissions by developing countries onto the centre-stage of 
international negotiations on climate change (Foot and Walter 2011: 182,186). In the period 
leading  to  the  2009  Copenhagen  climate  change  conference,  the  EU  had  managed  to 
deepen  its  bilateral  collaboration  on  climate  change  with  China,  while  the  negotiation 
positions of the two sides in multilateral fora witnessed a growing divergence.
At  the bilateral  level,  China and the EU continued to consult  on institutional  guarantees, 
funding arrangements, technical cooperation and other issues for enhancing capacities to 
address climate change  (Wen 2009).  The two sides deepened their Energy Dialogue and 
conducted concrete cooperation in the fields of renewable energy, clean coal, bio-fuel and 
energy efficiency. In 2008, President Barroso led a delegation of nine commissioners to visit 
Beijing and discuss climate change (amongst other issues). On that occasion, the EU and 
China  agreed  to  enhance  and  strengthen  their  cooperation  on  energy  saving,  emission 
reduction, environmental protection, climate change and technological innovation.11 Moreover, 
in January 2009, the European Commission and the Chinese Government signed a financing 
agreement to fund a joint EU-China Clean Energy Centre in Beijing, with the aim of providing 
a comprehensive approach (including technological but also political and regulatory tools) to 
develop clean energy technologies and to support Chinese efforts to switch to a low carbon 
economy. In  addition,  in  the  Joint  Statement  of  the  12th  EU-China  Summit  held  on  30 
November 2009, “the two sides recognized the comprehensive cooperation in the field of 
climate  change  between  the  EU  and  China,  and  agreed  to  enhance  coordination  and 
cooperation to further implement the EU-China Joint Declaration on Climate Change”, and “to 
upgrade the current Partnership on Climate Change”.12
11 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, 'China, EU start-up high level 
economic, trade dialogue', 25 April 2008, available at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t429082.htm 
12 Joint Statement of the 12th EU-China Summit, 30 November 2009, Nanjing, China, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/events/0022/joint_statement.pdf 
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The EU and China also tried to coordinate their positions on a bilateral  basis before the 
Copenhagen Conference (COP15).  At  the 11th EU-China Summit,  President  Barroso said 
there would be a huge area open for the EU and China to cooperate in the Copenhagen 
Conference based on their  partnership on climate change.  Chinese Premier  Wen Jiabao 
declared  that  China  was willing  to  contribute  to  a  positive  outcome at  the  Copenhagen 
conference together with the EU.13 In the Joint Statement of the 12th EU-China Summit, the 
two sides stated that they would work together with other parties “for a comprehensive, fair 
and  ambitious  outcome  at  the  UN  Climate  Change  Conference  in  December  2009  in 
Copenhagen”.14 At the same time, both the EU and China gave a positive evaluation of the 
role the other side was playing in addressing climate change. In addition,  the EU sent a 
delegation  to China on 13 July  2009 and held  talks with  Chinese officials  to  seek more 
cooperation with China, including speeding up international negotiations on climate change 
prior to the Copenhagen Conference (Li 2009). 
Despite these bilateral efforts, in practice divergences between the EU and China’s positions 
at the multilateral level tended to be more apparent and related to the essential structure and 
principles of a global regime on climate change (Bo 2010: 19). First, they diverged on the role 
of the Kyoto Protocol. With the clear signal that the US would not come back to Kyoto, and 
the ambitious target of having both China and the US taking on commitment under one treaty, 
the EU called for “a global and comprehensive agreement in Copenhagen that builds on and 
broadens the architecture of the Kyoto Protocol” in COP14,  held in 2008 (IISD 2008).  But 
China stressed that: 
the  UNFCCC  and  its  Kyoto  Protocol  are  documents  reflecting  (a)  global 
consensus and constitute  the basic legal  framework for  addressing climate 
change. […] Any attempts to deviate from, breach or re-define the Convention, 
or to deny the Kyoto Protocol, or to merge the Convention process with the 
Kyoto  Protocol  process,  will  be  detrimental,  and  will  ultimately  lead  to  a 
fruitless Copenhagen Conference (Xie 2008). 
Second, the EU and China again diverged on the sharing of responsibility and commitments 
for emission reductions between developed and developing countries. In this period, the EU 
highlighted common responsibilities,  while  playing down differentiated responsibilities  and 
exerted more pressure on major emerging countries especially China, provoking  Chinese 
13 'Wen  Jiabao  and  EU  leaders  meeting  with  Journalist',  20  May  2009,  http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2009-
05/21/content_1320555.htm 
14 Joint Statement of the 12th EU-China Summit, 30 November 2009, Nanjing, China, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/events/0022/joint_statement.pdf 
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opposition.  In COP14, the EU required at least  a 50% reduction at  global  level by 2050 
compared with 1990 levels, and for developing countries to deviate from business-as-usual 
by 15-30% by 2020.  By contrast,  China emphasized historical  responsibility  and outlined 
criteria  involving  cumulative  emissions  and  said  developed  countries  should  cut  their 
emissions  significantly  in  order  to  allow developing countries the space to develop (IISD 
2008).
The EU and China at the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference 
EU-China Collision at the Copenhagen Conference 
The Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change was the occasion for a more conflictual 
relationship between the EU and China on climate change, an event that can be divided into 
two phases. In the first half of the conference, the EU, together with the US, imposed direct 
pressure on China, which provoked an intense counterattack.  Indeed, despite the friendly 
bilateral contacts between the EU and China before the Copenhagen Conference, they had 
not, in reality, previously crossed swords with each other on the core issues of international 
climate change negotiations. When the Copenhagen conference’s curtain rose and the core 
issue of numerical targets was put on the table, the EU adopted the strategy of imposing 
pressure on China, intensively linked to the trilateral relationship among the US, China and 
the EU. Since the US had already committed itself to quantitative targets of emissions under 
UNFCCC,  the  EU  believed  that  the  US  would  not  take  on  more  commitments  without 
developing countries —especially China committing themselves more. Besides, there was no 
hope for the US coming back to the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, with the help of the US the EU 
attempted  to  urge  developing  countries  to  take  on  more  commitments  and,  in  return, 
expected to gain greater commitments from the US.
The divergences and confrontation between China and the EU involved the following aspects. 
Firstly, while the EU tended to merge the UNFCCC process with the Kyoto Protocol process, 
China insisted on  the dual-track  negotiating mechanism of  the  Convention  and its  Kyoto 
Protocol.  The  EU  in  the  conference  called  for  an  inclusive  Copenhagen  agreement, 
encompassing non-annex I parties and urged that the agreement should be translated into a 
universal,  legally-binding agreement in Copenhagen, or by a specified time in 2010  (IISD 
2009). The EU and the US also opposed references to the second commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol. Meanwhile, China, together with other developing countries, opposed a new 
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protocol.  They  stressed that  negotiations should result  in separate agreements under the 
AWG-KP  (Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the 
Kyoto Protocol) and AWG-LCA (Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action 
under the Convention) (IISD 2009). Secondly, the EU and China were not satisfied with each 
other’s numerical targets. China announced before the conference that it would reduce the 
intensity of carbon emissions per unit of its GDP by 40-45 percent by 2020 from the 2005 
level. The EU said it was not ambitious enough (Zhang and Zhang 2009: A6)   and wanted 
China to commit itself to more. The EU negotiator also tried to compare China’s numerical 
target with that of the EU’s, provoking China’s Chief Negotiator, Su Wei, to say that “the EU is 
unkind in comparing the two kinds of targets which are incomparable”  (Yan and Xu 2009). 
Fighting back, he argued that the target of the EU (a voluntary reduction of 20 percent from 
1990 levels and a 30 percent if others’ commitments to reductions were comparable), was 
"far from being enough”.15 Indeed “with a figure of 20%, the EU’s annual target of reduction is 
only  1.05%  which  does  not  reach  (even)  the  half  level  of  its  commitments  in  the  first 
commitment-period  of  Kyoto  Protocol.”16 Furthermore,  the  EU’s  policy  on  financial  aid  to 
developing  countries  is  also  problematic  in  China’s  eyes.  The  EU  promised  during  the 
Copenhagen  Conference  that  it  would  offer  a  “fast-start”  fund  of  €2.4  billion  annually  to 
developing  countries  and  would  take  into  consideration  the  pledges  of  other  developed 
countries  and  assume  a  “reasonable  share”.  China  complained  that  though  developed 
countries had made some pledges, the aid was too small to address the problem and there 
was no long-term, stable and predictable fund-raising mechanism (Xie 2009).
In the second half of the conference, the EU continued to  urge both China and the US to 
commit more. EU Commission President Barroso spoke at the UN High Level Segment in 
Copenhagen Conference, “… I would like to call on our partners in the US and China to 
contribute  further  to  a  successful  outcome  to  the  conference”.17 Sweden's  Environment 
Minister, Andreas Carlgren, stated on the same occasion, 
To  both  China  and  USA I  say:  your  ability  to  reduce  emissions  will  be 
absolutely  crucial.  It  is  promising  that  you  have  come  forward  with  your 
contributions in an international context. However, the world needs more and 
we are confident that you have the ability to deliver more. Let us be honest with 
15 'US,  EU  expected  to  do  more  on  emission  cuts:  China', Xinhua,  9  December  2009, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009copenhagenclimate/2009-12/09/content_9144762.htm 
16 'Unfair text infuriates  developing countries', People’s Daily, 10 December, 2009, A3
17 Statement by EU Commission President Barroso at the UN High Level Segment COP 15 Copenhagen Climate 
Change  Conference,  16  December  2009,  Copenhagen ,  http://www.europa-eu-
un.org/articles/fr/article_9343_fr.htm 
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each other: Together your ambitions to limit emissions will make or break the 
world´s efforts to keep global warming below 2 degrees celsius. 18
The EU’s strategy of urging upon both China and the US the necessity of committing more 
through the conference did not succeed in altering their stances. But it did lead to a degree of  
convergence between the US and China and other BASIC countries. As an emerging country 
eager to show itself as a responsible power,  China wanted a successful outcome from the 
Conference. At the same time, China claimed that it was still a developing country with low 
per capita GDP, and therefore tried hard to avoid binding and “unreasonable” commitments of 
reducing emissions in the present period. For the US, President Obama intended to break the 
deadlock of the negotiations and drive the conference to an agreement with a view to fulfilling 
his promise; at the same time, constrained by the Senate, he held a practical attitude to the 
conference, preferring to have a political agreement to a binding international protocol  (Bo 
and Chen 2011: 112).  Though President Obama expected China, India and other emerging 
economies to make pledges on emissions reduction, he needed all parties to compromise for 
a final  achievement.  In  this  context,  when the "mini-summit  of  the 25"  took  place on 18 
December, the EU leaders were determined to secure commitments from China and India on 
the  issue  of  the  goal  of  a  50-percent  reduction  in  global  CO2 emissions  by  2050  and 
continued to urge them to accept the target. But they soon met with direct opposition (Rapp et 
al. 2010). At a crucial moment, US president Obama intervened. Although he was also intent 
on reaching an agreement in the conference and securing a commitment from China and 
India, he was more pragmatic about the final outcome both due to the difficult situation of the 
conference and the domestic constraints he was facing. Therefore, he told his European 
counterparts that it would be best to shelve the concrete reduction targets for the time being 
and claimed that “China still is as desirous of an agreement, as we are" (Rapp et al. 2010). 
Later on, the US and BASIC countries held a joint meeting to reach an agreement. The EU 
was left  out  of  these negotiations.  Moreover,  the points  that  were most  important  to  the 
Europeans were removed from the draft  agreement,  in  particular  the concrete emissions 
reduction targets. China went beyond its previous choice of sticking closely to negotiating 
only within the G77 plus China and the EU’s leadership in climate change governance was 
seriously weakened (Bo and Chen 2011: 99).
18 'Statement  by  Sweden  on  behalf  of  the  European  Union  and  its  member  states', 16  December  2009
  http://andreas.centerpartiet.net/tag/cop15/ 
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Reflections on the Copenhagen Outcomes
The EU and China have different assessments of the Copenhagen Conference. Even if  the 
conference made “significant progress” in three areas, such as financing, deforestation and 
adaptation (Egenhofer and Georgiev 2009: 2), on the whole, the EU expressed its strong 
disappointment with the conference and its outcome. EU leaders criticized the final accord as 
lacking in ambition as it has not even reached the form of a binding agreement, but rather of 
a non-binding political pledge. EU Commission President Barroso stated on 21 December 
2009, “I will not hide my disappointment regarding the ambition in terms of the binding nature 
or non-binding nature of the future agreement. On this particular point, the text agreed today 
falls far short of our expectations”.19 Andreas Carlgren, the environment minister of Sweden, 
the country holding the rotating EU presidency, said that the summit meeting had been a 
“great failure” partly because other nations had rejected targets and a timetable for the rest of 
the world to sign on to binding emissions reductions (Kanter 2009).
According to the Communication 'Towards a comprehensive climate change agreement in 
Copenhagen', for the EU a successful conclusion of the conference would have meant an 
accord  containing  appropriate  targets  of  emissions  reduction  for  both  developed  and 
developing countries. Above all, it would have recognized a 2°C limit for the rise of the global  
average  temperature  (compared  to  pre-industrial  levels),  an  objective  requiring  specific 
reduction commitments by the whole of the international community. Moreover, for the EU it 
was  necessary  to  set  “concrete  new targets  and  actions”,  and  to  “provide  the  basis  for 
sustainable  development  by  strengthening”  countries’  capacity  of  adaptation  (European 
Commission COM 2009: 3). In this regard, the EU’s three main objectives for Copenhagen 
were:
1. to set new objectives for developed countries, with global targets of 25-40% by 2020 
and of 80-95% by 2050 to meet the 2°C objective. 
2. to  involve  developing  countries  in  the  battle  against  global  warming  by  adopting 
appropriate national actions and by contributing with a combined target of 15-30% 
reduction below the 1990 baseline by 2020. 
3. to  decide  on  adequate  financial  resources  in  order  to  back  up  all  the  actions 
designated  by  the  negotiated  accord,  namely  to  help  developing  countries  in 
mitigation and adaptation measures, to finance global research, and to establish valid 
measures on adaptation and on mitigation. 
19 Statement of EU Commission President Barroso on the Copenhagen Climate Accord, 21 December 2009, 
Copenhagen ,http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_9364_en.htm 
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Therefore the CA should have constituted the basis for establishing “a long-term international 
framework” capable of pooling the contributions from both the developed and the developing 
countries (Ibid: 12). In order to make this perspective more tempting for the other negotiators, 
the  EU  unilaterally  and  unconditionally  pledged  to  proceed  with  a  20% reduction  of  its 
emissions by 2020 (on a 1990 baseline), and to possibly move to a 30% if other countries 
made comparable  offers.  But  notwithstanding  the  EU’s  willingness  and  the  efforts  of  its 
negotiators in Copenhagen, the final CA fell very far from its ambitions, and failed to “produce 
a knock-out blow for a legally-binding post-Kyoto protocol” in the EU’s strategy (Wurzel and 
Connelly 2011: 272). 
China evaluated the Copenhagen conference and its outcome in a very positive way from the 
very beginning. The Chinese leadership firmly believed that the Copenhagen Conference was 
a  significant  and  successful  event.  The  Chinese  Foreign  Minister  Yang  Jiechi,  who 
accompanied Premier Wen to the conference, pointed out that the Copenhagen Conference 
provided an important opportunity for international cooperation in addressing climate change 
and “fully demonstrated the great attention that the international community pays to the issue 
of climate change and the strong political will that it  embraces to rise up to the challenge 
through closer cooperation” (Yang 2009).  Chinese leaders also thought that the outcome of 
the conference, the Copenhagen Accord as the only possible outcome from the conference, 
was both important and positive in that it upholds the principle of "common but differentiated 
responsibilities"  and the dual-track negotiating mechanism of  the UNFCCC and its Kyoto 
Protocol (Yang 2009; Xie 2009).
Apart from the different assessment on the Copenhagen Conference and the Accord, some 
European  leaders  and  media  pointedly  blamed  China  for  the  perceived  failure  at 
Copenhagen. Reports in the European press depicted China as the main culprit. In an article 
in The Guardian, Mark Lynas argued that China “wrecked the talks, […], and insisted on an 
awful ‘deal’ so Western leaders” would have walked away carrying the blame (Lynas 2009). 
Sharing this opinion was also the then British Secretary of State on Energy and Climate 
Change and now Labour Party leader, Ed Miliband, who accused China, together with Sudan 
and Bolivia, of having tried to hijack the conference in order to prevent the reaching of a 
comprehensive  accord  (Vidal 2009).  He  added  that  the  impossibility  of  reaching  an 
agreement on the pledge to move to a 50% reduction in global emissions by 2050, or an 80% 
reduction for developed countries, was due to China’s veto, “despite the support of a coalition 
of developed and the vast majority of developing countries” (Miliband 2009). China was also 
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accused of lacking real commitment by the attendance of its Deputy Foreign Minister instead 
of the Premier in the "mini-summit of the 25" attended by the heads of other countries. This 
was regarded as a diplomatic offence and a display of arrogant behaviour. 
Chinese  leaders  rejected  the Western  accusation  of  their  being  the  “wreckers”  of  the 
conference.  Chinese  Foreign  Ministry  spokeswoman  Jiang  Yu  harshly  criticized  those 
remarks made by "an individual British politician", containing "obvious political attempts" to 
“shirk the obligations of developed countries to  their  developing counterparts and foment 
discord among developing countries, but the attempt was doomed to fail”. He Jiankun, the 
deputy director of the National Expert Committee of Climate Change wrote an article in the 
People’s Daily refuting Miliband’s accusations from a more technical perspective (He 2010: 
A23). China’s leaders think that they played a positive and useful role in the Copenhagen 
Conference: the Chinese Premier,  Wen Jiabao, said in an interview that the country "has 
played an important and constructive role in pushing the Copenhagen climate talks to earn 
the current results, and demonstrated its utmost sincerity and made its best efforts"  (Wen 
2009). Chinese negotiators also took a flexible and constructive attitude to the 2 degrees 
celsius  issue  and  international  consultation  and  analysis  (Yu  2010).  Moreover,  Chinese 
negotiators believed that a 50% reduction in global emissions by 2050 or an 80% reduction 
for developed countries included in the agreement, and implicitly stipulating long-term binding 
commitments for developing countries as demanded by European leaders, would seriously 
constrain their future development space (He 2010: A23). Therefore, they firmly rejected the 
proposals.
However, despite of the EU and China’s different assessments and mutual criticisms, the two 
sides  still  shared  positions. Firstly,  they  both  held  that  international  climate  change 
negotiations in the Post-Copenhagen process should move forward in  the UN forum and 
called on all parties to actively and constructively participate in UN Conferences of climate 
change. Secondly, with the EU coming to acknowledge that the CA has made a big stride 
towards concluding a legally-binding global agreement on fighting climate change (European 
Commission 2010; EU Council 2010), both the EU and China emphasized that the CA should 
provide political guidance for further international climate change negotiations. Thirdly, they 
shared the long-term objective of keeping the rise of the global average temperature below 2 
degrees celsius compared to pre-industrial levels. Fourthly, they shared the general roadmap 
that  agreement  could be  reached first  on  such issues with  more  consensus as  finance, 
technology,  adaptation,  capacity building and forestry  while  the time frame of  reaching a 
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binding agreement could be postponed until the Durban Conference in 2011. These elements 
thus gave signs of their more pragmatic and productive cooperation afterwards.
From Copenhagen to Cancun
The EU’s “Pragmatic Change” and Renewed Partnership with China
The European Commission, in the communication following Copenhagen, reiterated that “the 
EU should continue to pursue a robust and effective international agreement and a legally-
binding” one “under the UNFCCC” (European Commission COM 2010: 4).  But given the 
current difficulties in reaching a new agreement with specific emission reduction pledges, the 
EU responded to the following rounds of climate change negotiations with a renewal of its  
negotiating strategy, scaling down its ambitions for the Cancun Conference. Taking note of 
the increasing centrality of the US and China’s responses and attitudes in the negotiations, 
the EU has thus started to consider the opportunity of converting its self-proclaimed “climate 
leadership”  role  into  that  of  a  “bridge  builder”  and  redirect  the  negotiations  towards 
transforming the CA’s voluntary pledges into an internationally binding agreement. The EU’s 
task was thus to “build on” these countries’ determination in order “to help channel it  into 
action”  (Ibid:  2),  transforming  the  political  declarations  made in  Copenhagen  into  a  UN-
negotiated legal text. Furthermore, the EU sought to make Cancun the platform to address a 
series  of  unresolved questions  remaining from Copenhagen,  such as  forestry  emissions; 
surpluses  in  emission  budgets  from  the  2008-2012  Kyoto  Treaty  period  (the  so-called 
“Russian  hot  air”);  designing  a  “robust  and  transparent”  framework  for  emissions  and 
performance accounting; and fast-start funding and long-term finance to help mitigation and 
adaptation measures in developing countries. Moreover the EU drew attention to the need to 
“establish a global policy framework for reducing emissions from international aviation and 
maritime transport” (European Union MEMO/10/627 2010: 4).
This “pragmatic change” in its negotiating strategy was due to the recognition that, in the 
presence of the ongoing divergences between the negotiating parties, the goal of reaching a 
comprehensive agreement in Cancun was unattainable. In the official EU documents indeed 
it can be noticed that the EU’s expectations for Cancun were to produce “a balanced package 
of decisions”, capable of capturing “the progress achieved in the negotiations so far” and of 
establishing  “major  elements  of  the  ‘architecture’  of  the  future  global  climate  regime” 
(European Union IP 2010: 2). There was no mention of specific targets for developed or 
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developing  countries  in  either  the  post-Copenhagen  Communication  or  in  the  Council 
conclusions preparing for the 16th Conference of the Parties, and the objective of a more 
inclusive  agreement  was  deferred  to  the  2011  Durban  Conference.  Therefore,  the  EU’s 
objectives  for  Cancun  were  limited  to  delivering  a  common  agreement  on  specific  and 
sectoral issues, in order to restore confidence in the international community on the possibility 
of brokering a more far-reaching agreement in the period following Cancun. Nevertheless, far 
from receding from its “leader” or at least “pusher” role, the EU continued to pursue its efforts 
by trying to convince third countries of the importance of taking more ambitious steps towards 
defining the future  climate  change regime.  In  the Communication  following Copenhagen, 
there is a specific recognition of the need to intensify bilateral and multilateral discussion 
outside the UN framework to “obtain a better understanding of the position, concerns, and 
expectations  of”  the  EU’s  partners  “on  key  issues”  and  “to  explain  clearly  what  the  EU 
requires of an agreement in terms of its ambition, comprehensiveness, and environmental 
integrity”. (European Commission COM 2010: 4-5). Thus, given the differentiated points of 
view and interests among the negotiating parties, an important element of the EU’s strategy 
was “to focus on building support with different partners”, as ways to “facilitate convergence 
on action-oriented decisions to be agreed in Cancun” (Ibid: 5). Among its targets, China is 
surely one of the most important.
With the pragmatic change of negotiating strategy of the EU, the partnership between the EU 
and China on climate change has been renewed.  In the run-up to the Cancun Conference, 
the EU and China decided to re-establish their bilateral cooperation and dialogue on the issue 
of climate change. On the occasion of a high level EU delegation visit to China, on 29 April 
2010,  the  Chinese  chief  negotiator  in  Copenhagen  and  Vice-president  of  the  National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Xie Zhenhua, and the EU Climate Action 
Commissioner, Connie Hedegaard, released a joint statement explaining the objectives of this 
renewed initiative. The new partnership established a new regular dialogue mechanism at 
ministerial level, whose aim was to produce positive outcomes at the Mexican climate summit 
through  deepened  understanding,  practical  cooperation,  and  an  exchange  of  views 
(Hedegaard and Xie 2010). The ministerial-level dialogue was then reinforced by a Climate 
Change Hotline at the chief negotiators’ level, facilitating “an expedited exchange of views 
and  sharing  of  information  on  new  developments  related  to  climate  change”,  and 
complemented by a senior officials’ dialogue and meetings at a working level (Ibid). Moreover, 
during  the  13th EU-China  summit  of  October  2010,  the  Chinese  and  European  leaders 
restated their commitment to continue participating in the climate change negotiations “under 
the  guidance  of  the  ‘Bali  Action  Plan’”  and  to  promote  “a  positive,  comprehensive  and 
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balanced  outcome  at  the  Cancun  conference”.  This  should  be  pursued  by  a  further 
enhancement of  “policy dialogue and practical  cooperation”  within the framework  of  their 
bilateral partnership on climate change (Council of the European Union PRESSE [267]: 2).
Nevertheless, despite its positive intentions, the renewed partnership has shown that its fruits 
are still unripe. On this point, the EU Energy Commissioner, Gunther Oettinger, underlined 
that even if the two partners have closer contacts, and despite the already “long” experience 
of  cooperation  on  the  climate  change  issue,  they  are  only  “at  the  beginning  of  a  real 
partnership” (Fu and Zhang 2010); the latest rounds of negotiations have clearly shown that 
this  was  the  case.  The  Tianjin  talks,  held  in  October  2010,  were  characterized  by  the 
continuing standoff between China and the US, confirming the by now secondary role of the 
EU. The two countries were both accused of hindering progress during negotiations, blocking 
the talks on a series of issues. Indeed, even if technical and forestry emissions questions 
have been moved forward by negotiators, any extension or substitution of the Kyoto Protocol 
as desired by the EU has been postponed to future negotiations (Watts 2010). And if Europe, 
together with the least developed countries, island states, Brazil and South Africa were willing 
to make progress in the negotiations and to make further compromises on the legal form of  
the agreement and the measures for verification, the stubbornness of the “G2”, i.e. China and 
the United States,  ensured that  any  new deal  would  be deferred at  least  until  the  2011 
Durban summit.  On the road to Cancun, world leaders were already aware that  the new 
agreement would lack ambition. In order to prevent another failure like Copenhagen, they 
even decided not to participate in the conference, leaving it to their environment ministers to 
attend.20
One Step Forward in Cancun
Despite  the  disillusioned  atmosphere  preceding  the  Cancun  Conference, Cancun 
Agreements were finally reached finally, which include specific points concerning: 
• finance to developing countries (the so-called “Green Climate Fund”, plus two finance 
bodies, the Transitional Committee, mentioned to design the Fund, and the Standing 
Committee, charged of the supervision and coordination of finance flows); 
• a framework to develop a mechanism to reduce emissions from deforestation (the so 
called REDD+ - Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation); 
20 On 1 December 2010, the Former Brazilian President Luis Ignacio da Silva Lula, overtly declared that no great 
leader is participating in the conference, at the most Ministers of the environment are taking part.  And as 
Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs  are  not  even participating,  there  would  not  be any  progress . Lula  eventually 
cancelled his flight to Cancun for the second week of negotiations (Le Monde 2010).
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• a new technology mechanism, aimed at sharing green technology; and 
• an accord on the development of measurement, report and verification (MRV) and 
international consultation and analysis (ICA) (Gupta 2010). 
Moreover, it makes the 2°C objective legally binding and anchors the emission pledges made 
by  developed  and  developing  countries  after  Copenhagen  to  a  formal  COP  decision. 
Nevertheless it  is still  the “lowest common denominator” agreed upon by the parties, with 
uncertainties even on the points settled by the agreement. For example, the accord has left 
uncertain  how  the  annual  $100  billion  for  the  Green  Climate  Fund  will  be  raised.  On 
technology cooperation, the accord lacks on details on how to facilitate the absorption of 
green  technologies  by  developing  countries  (Doyle  and  Wynn 2010;  Gupta  2010).  More 
important, it leaves open the question of defining a long-term global emission reduction goal: 
although the outcomes had the merit  of  addressing many of  the sensitive questions  like 
technology transfer and finance at the root of the North-South divide, the crucial point of the 
negotiations,  namely  how  to  establish  a  new  post-Kyoto  climate  regime,  still  remained 
intractable. Japan, Russia and Canada said no to a second period for the Kyoto Protocol 
without  the participation of  the US and China (Morales and Biggs 2010).  As for  the EU, 
accused of trying to scrap the Kyoto Protocol,21 it clearly stated that it was ready to commit 
itself for a second period, provided that the main emitters also joined in. For these reasons, 
as negotiators and the Mexican host wanted to produce an outcome from the conference at 
all costs, they made the decision to defer the question of renewing Kyoto to December 2011. 
In the absence of specific emission reduction commitments, the current situation could still  
lead to a 5°C rise in average global temperatures, a result that, according to the NGO Friends 
of the Earth, is "a slap in the face of those who already suffer from climate change" (Vidal and 
Goldenberg 2010).
Despite the lacunae, the EU and China both felt that the final agreements moved forward on 
some specific  and controversial  issues and kept  open the negotiation  process within  the 
UNFCCC. Xie Zhenhua affirmed that the conference, advancing “with the guidance of the Bali 
Road Map”, restored full confidence in the multilateral mechanism and in the future South 
African conference (Liu and Wang 2010). And for Connie Hedegaard, partially satisfied with 
the outcome, Cancun made new steps after Copenhagen, recognizing at the same time that 
the  journey  in  order  “to  reach  a  legally  binding  global  climate  deal”  is  still  “long  and 
challenging” (European Commission MEMO/10/673 2010). Yet China “did not manage to get 
21 There have been rumours of an EU attempt, together with small island states, to circumvent a second period of 
Kyoto by making a new proposal (Goldenberg 2010a).
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all it hoped” in Cancun (The Climate Group 2011: 10). Indeed the country was not satisfied 
with the fact  that  questions like a second commitment period for  the Kyoto Protocol,  the 
clarity of sources and sizes of the fund for developing countries and new, ambitious mitigation 
efforts from developed countries remain absent.  On the contrary,  for the EU Cancun has 
been able to provide a balanced and substantive package of decisions, as it was wished by 
the European Commission communication and by the Council conclusions of October 2010. 
But, there is also a recognition that there were still “other outstanding issues, such as the 
legal form of the agreement and how to provide long-term finance” to be solved (Hedegaard 
2010). 
As for the role played by the two actors during the conference, this time China was depicted 
by the international press as willing to make compromises, rather than being considered as 
the  “wrecker”  in  the  conference.  Deploying  a  new  strategy  based  on  flexibility  and 
transparency, it tried to demonstrate that the low ambition of the Copenhagen Accord was not 
due to its deliberate action, but rather to a lack of consensus among the main actors in the 
negotiations. And to avoid being blamed as the main hurdle of substantive progress in the 
negotiations, it adopted a more pragmatic strategy, demonstrating a willingness to deliver at 
least lowest common denominator results and to build consensus for more significant steps in 
the future. The new attitude towards transparency and flexibility has been demonstrated by a 
dramatic change of its stance on the issue of measurement, reporting and verification (MRV), 
showing  that  China  is  capable  of  facilitating  a  common  international  agreement  and  of 
removing one of the major points of disagreement it had with the Western countries. Indeed it 
agreed  to  submit  to  the International  Consultation and Analysis  (ICA)  mechanism,  which 
measures the efforts of developing countries while respecting the principle of common but 
differentiated  responsibilities  and  not  infringing  on the  sovereignty  of  states  during  its 
application (a matter of primary importance for China).22 Moreover,  in Cancun it adopted a 
publicity  strategy aiming at demonstrating past  and current  action in  dealing with climate 
change, by distributing a NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission23) Report 
recording  the  progresses  of  its  climate  change  policy  among  the  participants  to  the 
22 The ICA mechanism requires consultations and analysis  should take place every 2-3 years for  countries 
emitting more than 2% of GHG and every 4-5 years for the rest of the countries. Consultations will be handled 
by a group of experts coming from both developed and developing countries. Furthermore, it should respect a 
series of principles favouring the specific situations of developing countries, namely being non-punitive and, 
above all, taking into account the respective capabilities of each developing country. 
23 The National  Development and Reform Commission is  the Chinese governmental  agency responsible for 
economic policy,  with broad administrative and planning tasks.  Since 1998 it  is  also in  charge of  climate 
change policy, as the climate change issue inevitably involves the economic aspects. Moreover, it is home to 
the National Coordination Committee on Climate Change, an inter-agency group chaired by the Chinese Prime 
Minister, whose aim is to coordinate the governmental agencies involved in the climate change policy-making.
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conference24 (Seligsohn 2010). Opting for “a constructive, low-key approach”, (Goldenberg 
2010b) China finally managed to significantly restore its international image. 
For its part,  the EU tried to play the role of a “bridge builder”  in Cancun, helping to find 
solutions to the disputes over a second Kyoto  Protocol  period.  Representing the Belgian 
Presidency of the Council,  the Flemish Minister  for the Environment,  Nature and Culture, 
Joke Schauvliege, said that “the EU has worked tirelessly to be a bridge-builder in Cancun 
while also advancing its positions”, further adding that “the EU has reported transparently on 
the progress it has made in mobilizing the €7.2 bn of fast-start funding it has pledged over 
2010-2012” (European Union IP 2010). Concerning the ability to negotiate as a unitary actor, 
the Achilles’ heel for the EU in Copenhagen, Hedegaard officially stated that “Europe has 
succeeded in speaking with one voice” (European Commission MEMO/10/673 2010). But 
these claims were controversial and have been disputed. During the conference, the EU was 
accused “of taking unfair advantage of poor countries” by insisting that providing loans to 
reduce emissions is better than providing grants. Indeed, in Cancun the EU started talking 
about giving part of its pledged funds in the forms of loans, an outrageous proposal for many 
NGOs,  fearing that  these loans will  add  another  burden to countries  already fighting for 
development  (Willis  2010).  Seeking  to  counter  this  accusation,  the  EU’s  chief  climate 
negotiator,  Dr  Arthur  Runge  Metzger,  asserted  that  “loans  are  often  made  on  highly 
concessional terms”, including a “major grant element of up to 75%”, and do not concern 
countries unable to repay them (cited in Vidal 2010). But one anonymous negotiator from a 
developing  country  affirmed  that  EU  member  states’  methods  of  accounting  for  climate 
pledges are all different, making it all “a complete mess”. And according to Al Gore, they are 
“using creative accounting to cover up their shortfalls”, giving the impression to developing 
countries  that  developed  countries  use  these  tactics  in  order  to  avoid  meeting  their 
commitments  (cited  in  Vidal  2010).  Criticisms of  its  “creative  accounting”  measures  also 
arose among NGOs. According to Tim Gore,  Oxfam's senior climate advisor, "countries are 
definitely  using creative accounting to cover  up for  their  shortfalls”  (cited in  Willis  2010). 
Moreover,  NGOs  also  highlighted  that  developed  countries’  pledges  were  not  new  and 
additional  funds  as  established  in  Copenhagen,  but  rather  re-cycled  money,  increasing 
distrust  among  developing  countries  on  the  seriousness  of  developed  countries’ 
engagements. On this point, the European Environmental Bureau’s (EEB) assessment of the 
Belgian Presidency was positive, confirming that in 2010 the EU actually mobilized €2.35bn 
24 The initiative was accompanied by the Climate Group civil society initiative of the “China Day” in the “Climate 
Leaders Summit” (6-8 December 2010), a fringe event held on 6 December 2010, aimed at promoting contacts 
between Chinese government officials and their international counterparts during the period of the Mexican 
conference (The Climate Group 2010)
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of its promised  €7.2bn for the 2010-2012 period of ‘fast start finance’ and that the money 
assumed the form of grants and not of loans. However, the assessment also highlights that it 
remains unclear how the money for the $100bn annual green climate fund will be raised, as 
well as the EU’s share of contribution (EEB 2010).
Criticisms were also expressed about  the role played by the EU during the negotiations. 
While there is a general consensus on the EU’s ability to speak with one voice, opinions are 
divided over its capacity to play a leadership role during the negotiations. For CAN Europe 
(Climate Action Network Europe) one of the positive outcomes of the Cancun conference was 
the ability of the EU to reassert itself as one of the key players in the negotiations.25 And for 
The Climate Group, the EU was also able to play a leading role (The Climate Group 2011: 
11). Yet, other climate activists were surprised with the reticence of the European delegation 
to take a strong position. The head of WWF Britain, Keith Alliot, affirmed that the EU spent a 
lot of time “licking its wounds” after Copenhagen and showed continuing internal divisions 
over the question of stepping up its commitment from 20% by 2020 to 30%. The offer of the 
unconditional 20% and of 30% if other countries make comparable commitments remained 
unchanged since Copenhagen. And if some member states (like UK, France and Germany) 
were already willing to opt for a unilateral 30%, other states still wanted to stick to the 20% 
objective, a lack of cohesion tarnishing the image of the EU’s vaunted capability of “speaking 
with one voice” (Cermak 2010). Jennifer Morgan, of the World Resources Institute, argued 
that EU officials were “rather passive” in Cancun, afraid of crossing the “red lines” that had 
been set by the European heads of government.26 By reporting activists’ words, Cermak adds 
that “the EU's more passive role at this conference is a shame […] because the EU has 
historically been one of the leaders in climate negotiations”. (Ibid) Even the verdict of the EEB 
is negative. Indeed, the indecision of moving to a 30% emission reduction unilaterally made 
the EU lose the opportunity to “set the right tone to the negotiations, that the EU is ready to 
do a larger part  of its fair share” (EEB 2009: 4),  an element capable of restoring its lost  
“leadership by example” (Oberthür 2007: 8).
However, it must be remembered that without a significant move from the American and the 
Chinese sides, Cancun could not deliver the expected results to save the planet. Moreover, 
25 CAN Europe is the European branch of a worldwide network of over 550 civil society organizations whose 
battle is to limit human-induced climate change and promote sustainable development. The information has 
been retrieved from their official press: 'Cancun agreement sets stage for EU to increase its climate ambitions', 
11  December  2010,  available  at  http://www.caneurope.org/policywork/un-climate-negotiations/286-cancun-
agreement-sets-stage-for-eu-to-increase-its-climate-ambitions 
26 Ibid. This is basically due to the fact that the EU mandate is the fruit of difficult compromises and is not easy to 
renegotiate.
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given the disagreements between the main actors before the event,  the EU was already 
conscious that a consensus on the most pressing issues, namely emission targets, was still a 
remote  prospect.  Thus  it  preferred  to  secure  an  agreement  on  the  objectives  where  a 
consensus  could  be  found,  and  this  “pusher”  role  was  overtly  recognized.  As  Connie 
Hedegaard reports,  the Mexican Foreign Affairs’ Minister,  Patricia  Espinosa,  affirmed that 
“without the constructive work of Europe it would have been impossible to bring the process 
back  on  track”  (Hedegaard  2010).  Yet  the  Cancun  Conference  left  the  international 
community with many issues still to be solved in the next negotiations. And it made 2011 the 
decisive year for seeing the parties agree on specific commitments in order to save or to 
replace the expiring Kyoto Protocol, with the first moves coming from the “North” side. But the 
present international context – the debt crisis of the Eurozone, the recovery efforts to exit 
from the 2008 economic crisis and the Mid-Term elections in the US, that saw Obama lose 
his majority in the House of Representatives and with it  his ambitions to pass his climate 
change bill in Congress – weakened the hope for more ambitious action from the developed 
countries. Developing countries, especially newly emerging economies, despite their already 
public commitments to reducing their emissions, would continue to refuse binding pledges by 
invoking the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. This situation makes the 
prospect of reaching a more decisive agreement in Durban very confused and unlikely. And 
the latest rounds of talks in Bonn (6-17 June 2011) seemed to confirm this scenario. The lines 
of contention still run on the “eternal” North-South divide, with developing countries accusing 
developed countries of  refusing further emission reduction commitments to maintain their 
economic  privileges  (Max  2011).  The  talks  concluded  with  countries  “still  nowhere  near 
agreement in three key areas of finance, greenhouse gases cuts and the future of the Kyoto 
Protocol” (Vidal 2011). However, despite these daunting results of negotiations, cooperation 
is still moving forward outside the formal confines of the UN. On the EU and China side, low-
carbon  cooperation  is  still  ongoing,  receiving  a  significant  boost  behind  the  scenes  of 
Cancun. On 3 December 2010, the European Investment Bank announced a €500 million 
grant to China to support low-carbon projects, a move provoking new optimism about the 
seriousness of the two partners to tackle climate change, and that will enable China to reduce 
CO2 emissions by three tons per year (La Repubblica 2010).
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Conclusions 
As discussed above, past bilateral cooperation and dialogue between the EU and China have 
shown mixed impacts on the construction of a multilateral climate change regime. From the 
very  beginning  of  their  relations  on  the  climate  change  issue,  their  contacts  were 
characterized  by  a  constant  divergence  on  developing  countries’  responsibilities.  Indeed, 
while the EU has always promoted a sharing of efforts between developed and developing 
countries (under the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities), China insisted on 
the historical responsibility of developed countries and on the right to growth of developing 
ones.  Nevertheless,  except  in  the  Copenhagen  conference,  these  divergences  have  not 
hindered the EU and China cooperating with each other in advancing the Kyoto regime, Bali 
Roadmap, and Cancun Agreements. In fact, since the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol in 
2005, their relations have been significantly enhanced, especially with the establishment of 
the Partnership on Climate Change. This partnership enabled the two actors to improve their 
exchanges on the climate issue, and to institute concrete cooperation projects. 
Nevertheless, bilateral activity does not always ensure that the two parties act  as partners. 
While China and the EU continue to consult each other bilaterally, this may not be reflected at 
the multilateral level, as demonstrated by the bitter collision in the Copenhagen conference. 
The reasons were different and can be partly ascribed both to the EU’s multiple weaknesses 
during the negotiations and to China’s inflexible position.  During the Conference,  the EU 
continued to urge upon China a pledge to international binding commitments, while it was 
already clear from the beginning that China would not accept them. At the same time, the 
EU’s expectations of reaching a comprehensive agreement in Copenhagen were too high, 
given  that  the  atmosphere  preceding  the  event  was  already one  of  disillusionment  and, 
because of  the  financial  crisis,  the attention of  both developed and developing countries 
shifted to national economic issues. This particular conjuncture was also the basis of the 
dissent among EU member states, making them incapable of agreeing on an ambitious plan 
to  reduce  their  GHG emissions  and  on  aid  for  adaptation  and  mitigation  for  developing 
countries (Groen and Niemann 2010: 23). 
After the disappointing experience in Copenhagen, in Cancun the EU demonstrated a much 
more  pragmatic  approach.  Acknowledging  that  a  comprehensive  agreement  on  a  “Kyoto 
Protocol-style”  was  impossible  to  reach  and  that  divergences  among  developed  and 
developing countries were still sharp, the EU sensibly scaled down its ambitions, adopting a 
more “sectoral approach”, namely pushing on the issues that were not highly controversial 
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among the parties and on which an agreement could be “easily”  reached.  But  it  did not 
substantially change its basic position on its emissions reduction, nor has it proven to have a 
serious approach on the financial issues. In our view, there are some elements that need 
improvement in order to enhance the EU’s capacity to be one of the critical actors in the 
negotiations.
Firstly, by lowering its ambitions, playing the role of a “bridge builder” among the parties and 
pushing further on its  commitments,  the EU can still  play a leadership  role.  If  “voluntary 
cooperation” is defined as a basic feature of multilateralism, (Bouchard and Peterson 2011: 1) 
the EU has to find common ground with other key players. It is useful to remember that the 
EU is still one of the most committed parties in the negotiations and this can provide it with 
leverage to push the negotiation process forward. But in order to make this possible, the EU 
needs to strengthen its pledges, which are no longer credible, for example by moving from 
the unconditional 20% to an unconditional 30%. It also needs to be clearer on the issue of 
finance to developing countries, as the choice of loans instead of grants raises many doubts 
about the EU’s willingness and capacity to finance adaptation and mitigation measures in 
vulnerable countries, especially after the global financial and the Euro zone crisis. 
Secondly, the EU should make a better use of its partnership with China. Despite six years of 
bilateral contacts on the climate change issue, the EU seems not yet to have understood 
what China wants or how to deal with it.  However, what is clear is that putting  excessive 
pressures on China could be counter-productive. It will not lead to a change of its negotiating 
position,  but  will,  rather,  entrench  the country’s  position.  It  is  perhaps better  to  continue 
involving China on issues in which the country could reasonably be expected to cooperate 
(for example on technical cooperation), enhancing mutual understanding and trying to find 
shared points to defend in  international negotiations.  The EU and China are only  “at  the 
beginning of a real partnership” (Fu and Zhang 2010). If it is up to them to play a significant 
role in the negotiations, mutual comprehension should be reinforced, together with a renewed 
practical cooperation on the climate change issue. Yet, we would particularly highlight the fact 
that in this bilateral relation words are not enough, and that China needs incentives to be 
further involved in  the battle against  climate change.  Such an approach should take into 
account China’s development needs. This could finally lead to the most concrete realization 
of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, a point shared by both partners. 
Finally, it should be kept in mind that nowadays the EU’s influence on China’s international 
stance can only be marginal. We would suggest that if the EU’s internal climate change policy 
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succeeds  in  helping  the  European  countries  meet  their  emission  targets  while  avoiding 
excessive costs for their economies and/or providing stimuli for their industrial sectors, China 
will be very interested in learning from the European example. This would help the country in 
boosting its national measures to reduce its dependency from coal and, finally, to reduce its 
GHG emissions. But there will not be significant changes in China’s international negotiating 
position unless the US also makes a concrete move. In China’s eyes, notwithstanding its 
ranking as the first greatest world polluter, it  is paradoxical that it  is asked to make more 
efforts and to commit internationally when the second greatest polluter still occupies a free 
rider position and produces so-called “luxury emissions” (whereas China’s emissions can be 
considered “developmental” or “survival” ones). In other words, without the US on board, the 
Chinese will hardly make substantial concessions at the international level.
To conclude on an optimistic note, we feel that both China and the EU are still the two crucial 
actors in the future negotiating process. Indeed, both the EU and China may prove central in 
the climate change negotiations by showing a more active approach and putting pressure on 
the US, still  blocked in Congress on its climate bill.  For its part,  the EU should continue 
playing a role of bridge builder between developed, developing and emerging countries. On 
the other side, China could “facilitate the reaching of a compromise” by easing its negotiating 
language on the commitments of non-Annex I countries (De Matteis 2010). In order to make 
this  possible,  their  renewed bilateral  dialogue on climate change needs to go forward in 
reconciling their positions and defining a common strategy for the next round of negotiations. 
If this situation occurs in the near future, their bilateral cooperation may move beyond the 
purely rhetorical and engender significant progress in future negotiations. Indeed, something 
already has moved at the bilateral level. The example of the European bilateral partnerships 
for  climate  change  with  the  emerging  economies  pushed  the  US  to  propose  similar 
arrangements with China, trying to catch up with the Sino-European initiative (Dai and Diao 
2011:  264).  This is  a positive signal  from the American side,  especially given that  future 
climate change negotiations will run along the lines of a Sino-American ‘entente’. As the two 
giants are also the two biggest greenhouse gases emitters, to which the whole international 
community is looking, and that they both observe each other’s stance and take new steps on 
the climate change issue, a Sino-American dialogue and cooperation on these issues might 
increase  the  possibilities  of  reaching  a  future  climate  accord,  mainly  depending  on  the 
concessions they will be able to make in order to reach an agreement. If the EU succeeds in 
treasuring this new resource by pushing on both the US and the Chinese side, the prospect 
for a new international solution for the climate change issue will  not be as bleak as they 
appeared after Copenhagen.
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